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ABSTRACT
Line Speed Publish/Subscribe Inter-networking (LIPSIN)
is one of the proposed forwarding mechanisms in Infor-
mation Centric Networking (ICN). It is a stateless source-
routing approach based on Bloom filters. However, it has
been shown that LIPSIN is vulnerable to brute-force attacks
which may lead to distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) at-
tacks and unsolicited messages. In this work, we propose
a new forwarding approach that maintains the advantages
of Bloom filter based forwarding while allowing forwarding
nodes to statelessly verify if packets have been previously
authorized, thus preventing attacks on the forwarding mech-
anism. Analysis of the probability of attack, derived analyt-
ically, demonstrates that the technique is highly-resistant to
brute-force attacks.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Publish-Subscribe Internet Technology architecture
(PURSUIT) is one of the promising ICN candidates for a
future Internet. It aims at redesigning the current Internet
to solve many existing limitations such as security, rout-
ing scalability, multicast. The PURSUIT architecture de-
fines the following three types of network entities: publish-
ers (Pub), subscribers (Sub), and mediation system. The
mediation system is broken down into two functions: Ren-
dezvous (RV ) and topology management (TM ). These two
functions control the third function: forwarding (FW ). The
network connectivity is expressed by flat, Bloom filter-based
identifiers called LIds where each edge in the network has at
least two unidirectional LIds, one in each direction.
The RV is responsible for matching publishers and sub-
scribers for a given information item. When a match is
detected, the RV contacts the TM, which is responsible for
maintaining intra-domain knowledge of an autonomous sys-
tem and to construct a delivery path in the form of a LIPSIN
forwarding identifier (FId) [2]. After the path has been de-
fined, the FW nodes are responsible for packet switching
and delivering the information item from the Pub to the
Sub. The POINT project [1] builds on this architecture to
also introduce a network attachment point (NAP) for user
equipment (UE) to attach to the network. The UE may
be either standard IP clients or may use LIPSIN for a na-
tive ICN interface. Devices that use native ICN might in-
clude those that are newly developed, for example Internet
of Things (IoT) devices. This paper is relevant to this latter
type of device.
2. RELATEDWORK
In the LIPSIN forwarding approach [2], false positives may
exist such that packets can be forwarded over links that were
not intended to be included in the forwarding path; this can
be exploited to launch a brute-force attack. In this attack,
a malicious node tries all, or a sufficiently large number of,
possible FIds to obtain one that generates false positives and
reaches a target. The probability, pfw, of guessing a valid
FId of a Bloom filter constructed with a maximum fill factor
of ρm, k hash functions and representing a path length of l
is given by [2]:
pfw = ρ
k·l
m (1)
In [4], it has been shown that replay attacks and computa-
tional attacks are also possible. During a replay attack the
attacker exploits a previously created valid FId for sending
non-requested traffic. A computational attack is launched
by collecting a number of valid FIds and analyzing the cor-
relation between their bit patterns.
Building upon the LIPSIN forwarding scheme, and prior
work [2, 4], this paper proposes a forwarding approach that
effectively prevents the above mentioned attacks, using net-
work capabilities. In the rest of this paper, we describe our
proposed forwarding approach, and analyse the resistance of
our solution to brute-force attacks.
3. SECURE ATTACHMENT APPROACH
In this approach, we propose a validation mechanism that
checks the legitimacy of FIds sent by a publisher, at the
ingress of the network. The approach is based on the fol-
lowing assumptions: no FW node in the network is hostile;
the FW node that is directly connected to a user is the NAP;
and, each such node holds a pair of 128-bit long master keys,
k1, k2.
3.1 Secure FId Generation
In the following, we refer to the original forwarding iden-
tifier generated by the TM as FId and its encrypted form
is eFId ; whereas the one used by the Pub is called eFIdp
and its decrypted form is FIdp. The hash that is taken over
eFId is referred to as h, whereas the hash that is used by the
Pub is hp. In the case of legitimate UE: eFIdp = eFId and
hp = h. In this scheme, the process of generating the FId
is almost the same as in LIPSIN, the only difference is that
the constructed FId is sent by the TM to the NAP instead
of the publisher. Upon receiving the FId by the NAP, the
FId is encrypted using the AES algorithm, which as a result
produces an encrypted eFId. The purpose of this encryption
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step is to preserve the confidentiality of the FId, so that a
computational attack is prevented by hiding the content of
the FId from the Pub.
To prevent brute-force attacks, the NAP node creates
a 64-bit hash h over the encrypted FId using k2 so that
the hash becomes bound to a specific FId. Then, the
pair {eFId, h} is then forwarded to the relevant directly
connected Pub in order to be used in the communication
with the subscriber. Note that the Pub, which might be a
lightweight device, does not have to compute any encryption
algorithms.
3.2 Secure FId Forwarding
Upon receiving the pair {eFId, h} from the NAP the pub-
lisher starts the communication with the subscriber by plac-
ing this pair in each transmitted packet header and forward-
ing it to its local NAP. When the NAP receives a packet from
the Pub, it first performs two checks: the security check and
the forwarding check. The purpose of the security check is to
validate the received eFIdp, whether it is legitimate and has
been created by the TM. This check is performed once and
only for packets coming from the publisher. The forwarding
check is the LIPSIN membership check that is performed
to decide where packets should be forwarded for the next
hop [2]. An incoming packet is forwarded to the next hop
only if it passes these two checks. In the security check, the
NAP checks the integrity of the received eFIdp.
If the packet passes the security check, then the eFIdp is
assumed to be legitimate. In this case the NAP replaces the
encrypted eFIdp with a plaintext copy of the FIdp. Then,
the forwarding check is performed against each outgoing in-
terface using the FIdp. If the result of the check is true, then
the packet is forwarded to the next FW node along the path.
At each subsequent FW node, only the forwarding check is
performed. To prevent replay attacks, the master key k2
that is used to protect the hash is changed periodically.
4. ATTACK ANALYSIS
The proposed forwarding approach effectively stops the
previously described attacks. For example, to inject traffic
to a victim 4-hops away using a brute-force attack, then the
attack has to pass both the security check and the forward-
ing check at the NAP, and also pass subsequent forwarding
checks in the FW nodes along the path. In this section, we
analyse the probability of injecting unwanted traffic using
brute-force attacks. The probability of passing the forward-
ing check, pfw, is the probability of guessing a valid FId
that causes false positives along a path, which is given by
(1). The probability of passing the security check psc will
now be determined and is equivalent to guessing the hash
using the, so-called, birthday paradox attack [3]. To show
how a collision is found in the context of our approach, as-
sume H is a hash function such that H : D → R, where D is
the set of all possible combinations of FIds, R is the range of
H, and |R| = r, the number of all possible hashes. A hash
collision occurs when having distinct eFId1, eFId2 ∈ D
where H (FId1) = H (FId2). To estimate how many attack
attempts x, consisting of injecting random pairs {FId, h},
are required to achieve a given probability psc of finding a
hash collision, we use the following approximation [3]:
x ≈
√
2r ln
1
1− psc (2)
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Figure 1: Attack probability, pa, using proposed
eFID or LIPSIN over different path-lengths. eFId:
m = 256, |h| = 64. LIPSIN: m = 320. Bloom filter has
23 LIds with k = 5.
Therefore, to successfully reach a victim, the attacker has
to pass all checks at the NAP and the subsequent on-path
FW nodes, and the probability of this is: pa = psc × pfw.
Figure 1 shows the probability pa for different attack path
lengths l in both approaches: the existing LIPSIN approach
and the proposed NAP approach. The left figure represents
the case when n = 23 LIds and shows a significant improve-
ment in the probability pa when using the encrypted FId.
For example, when psc is 10
−6 the probability of attack pa to
reach a victim attached to the same attacker’s NAP node is
≈ 1.3× 10−8 compared with approximately ≈ 0.0001 when
deploying the basic LIPSIN forwarding approach. This is
just to pass the first node on the path, and the probability
pa gets lower as the number of hops increases.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a new approach to protect the forwarding
plane against brute-force attacks, computational attacks and
replay attacks in the PURSUIT ICN architecture has been
presented. This mechanism uses encryption to identify ille-
gitimate forwarding identifiers at the ingress of the network.
With this mechanism, the probability of a brute-force at-
tack has been significantly reduced compared to the basic
LIPSIN forwarding.
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